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COMMENTS 
THE PHILADELPHIA PLAN AND STRICT 
RACIAL QUOTAS ON FEDERAL CONTRACTS 
J. INTRODUCTION 
In 1967, after an exhaustive review of the national employment 
situation in specific cities, the Department of Labor concluded 
that nonwhite workers were almost wholly excluded from membership 
in the industrial and craft unions which serve the building industry 
in the city of Philadelphia.1 Such exclusion was found to be tanta-
mount to unemployment in that industry, much of which is located 
in the economically depressed areas where the nonwhite worker must 
live. The percentage of nonwhites belonging to these construction 
and craft unions corresponded almost exactly to the number of non-
white workers employed under the lucrative Federal construction 
contracts, an incredible one percent! 2 
The Labor Department, in an attempt to combat this blatant 
discrimination by contractors and unions, issued the Philadelphia 
Plan in 1967, requiring government contractors to take affirmative 
action to hire minority workers. That plan, having been found 
illegal by the Comptroller General of the United States, was dropped, 
and a revised Philadelphia Plan was issued in 1969.8 Because the 
Department found virtual exclusion in six of the high paying crafts, 
the Plan was designed to apply (initially at least) to those six trades. 
It was later announced, however, that the Plan would be extended 
to other trades in the Philadelphia area, and to other areas of the 
country, should it prove to be a success in Philadelphia.4 This brief, 
that such a Plan will be extended nationwide and thereby reach and 
affect innumerable industries and unions, has stimulated an involved 
controversy which has surrounded the Plan since its inception and 
has led the Department of Labor, the Attorney General, the Comp-
troller General, the AFL-CIO, and even the Congress of the United 
States to do battle on the issue of the Philadelphia Plan. 
1 The Labor Department's study of the construction industry in the Philadelphia 
area was promulgated in the Department of Labor Order of September 23, 1969, at 4 
(unpublished order) [hereinafter cited as September 23 Order]. 
2 ld. 
s Department of Labor Order of June 27, 1969 [hereinafter cited as June 27 
Order]. 
4 See Department of Labor News Release, June 27, 1969, at 2. See also remarks 
by Assistant Secretary of Labor Fletcher that the Plan may be extended to twenty 
specified cities within the very near future. L.A. Times, Feb. 9, 1970, § 1, at 4, col. 4. 
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This comment will analyze the Plan-what it says, and what it 
will mean for the minority workers for whom it was created. Ques-
tions of legality, constitutionality, and effectiveness of the Plan will 
be discussed. In addition, questions raised by a tougher and more 
controversial plan, which, it is proposed, is necessary to end racial 
discrimination on Federally-assisted contracts, will be considered. 
II. EMPLOYMENT REALITIES FOR THE NONWHITE WORKER 
The economic facts of life for a minority or nonwhite worker 
are very simple: he will have much less opportunity to join an all 
important union than if his skin were white; if he does manage to 
get a job despite his highly visible handicap, he will have to work 
for a great deal less money than if his skin were white; if he is 
hired, his chances of staying on that job for any length of time are 
considerably less than if his skin were white.5 Federal, state, and 
local government units have tried to end this situation through a 
variety of devices, including Presidential Executive Orders issued 
by the past three Presidents,6 the 1964 Civil Rights Act which 
devoted an entire title to employment practices and job discrimina-
tion,7 and state and local Fair Employment Practices Commissions.8 
Yet with all these devices, very little has changed for the nonwhite 
worker; "the present minority participation in ... trades (is) far 
below that which should have reasonably resulted from participa-
tion in the past without regard to race, color, and national origin 
119 
5 Since World War II the nonwhite's unemployment rate has been double that of 
the white's. Even though the total number of unemployed has dropped, the 2-1 ratio 
has remained constant. In addition, the median income of the nonwhite has never 
been more than 60% of the white's income. See generally EQUAL EMPLOYMENT 
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, REPORT No. 1 (1966) j REPORT OF THE NATIONAL 
ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS (1968); Peter, Housing: From Crisis to 
Disaster? LooK, Feb. 10, 1970, at 53; M. HARRINGTON, THE OTHER AMERICA, ch. 4: 
If You're Black Stay Back (1962). 
6 Exec. Order No. 10,925, 26 Fed. Reg. 1977 (1961); Exec. Order No. 11,246, 30 
Fed. Reg. 12,319 (1965); reaffirmed in, Exec. Order No. 11,375, 32 Fed. Reg. 14303 
(1967), and adopted by President Nixon in Exec. Order No. 11,478, 34 Fed. Reg. 12985 
(1969). 
7 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1964). 
8 See, e.g., CAL. LABoR CoDE §§ 1410-1432 (West Supp. 1970). 
9 September 23 Order, supra note I, at 5. It was found that minority group mem-
bership in the six major trade unions was: 
I. Iron workers-1.4% 
2. Steamfitters-.65% 
3. Sheetmetal workers-1% 
4. Electricians-1.76% 
5. Elevator Construction Workers-.54% 
6. Plumbers & Pipefitters-.51% 
Id. at 4-S. 
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III. THE ORIGINS AND REQUIREMENTS OF THE 
PHILADELPHIA PLAN 
819 
The original Philadelphia Plan, issued in 1967, was formulated 
with the avowed purpose of ending the low level of minority em-
ployment on Federal projects in the city of Philadelphia. It was 
intended to implement the anti-discrimination program set forth 
in Executive Order 11246 which is directed at all government con-
tractors. Section 2 02 ( 1) of the Order provides: 
The contractor will not discriminate against any employee or appli-
cant for employment because of race, color, religion, sex or national 
origin. The cont·ractor will take affirmative action to ensure that ap-
plicants are employed, and that employees are treated during employ-
ment, without regard to their race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin. Such action shall include but not be limited to the following: 
employment upgrading, demotion or transfer; recruitment or recruit-
ment advertising; layoff or termination; rates of pay or other forms 
of compensation; and selection for training, including apprenticeship.10 
Unlike the Order, the Plan was designed to deal with the em-
ployment problems of a small number of trades in a restricted area. 
It required contract bidders to commit themselves to specified 
affirmative action programs for nonwhite workers. The Comptroller 
General of the United States, viewing his office as auditor and 
watchdog of government expenditures,11 declared this Plan to be 
invalid, as violating competitive bidding principles.12 He based this 
finding on the fact that bidders had no specific idea, under the Plan, 
what numerical goals they were committing themselves to at the 
bidding stage.13 The Labor Department set out to remedy this defect 
10 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319 (1965). 
11 "Our interest and authority in the matter exists by virtue of the duty imposed 
upon our Office by the Congress to audit all expenditures of appropriated funds, which 
necessarily involves the determination of the legality obligating the Government to 
payment of such funds. Authority has been specifically conferred on this Office to 
render decisions to the heads of departments and agencies of the Government, prior 
to the incurring of any obligations with respect to the legality of any action con-
templated by them involving expenditures of appropriated funds, and this authority 
has been exercised continuously by our Office since its creation whenever any question 
as to the legality of a proposed action has been raised, whether by submission by an 
agency head, or by complaint of an interested party, or by information coming to our 
attention in the .course of our other operations." Comptroller General's Opinion, 
August 5, 1969, at 2 (unpublished opinion) [hereinafter cited as Comptroller General's 
Opinion]. 
12 47 COMP. GEN. 666 (1968). 
13 The only court to hear the merits of such a plan disagreed with the Comptroller 
General on its legality. In Weiner v. Cuyahoga Community College District, 19 Ohio 
2d 35, 249 N.E.2d 907 (1969), cert. denied, 90 S. Ct. 554 (1970), the Ohio Supreme 
Court held that a "Cleveland Plan," established by the State and Federal Govern-
ments, was constitutional, and a proper action under the 1964 Civil Rights Act. That 
Plan required affirmative action programs in government contract bids, but did not 
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while still attempting to use the "color blind" approach envisioned 
in E.O. 11246. Two years later, in June of 1969, the revised Phila-
delphia Plan was announced. 
The scope of the revised Plan is virtually the same as the 1967 
Plan. It is applicable to the five counties in and around Philadel-
phia,14 applies only to contractors with Federal or Federally-assisted 
construction contracts which exceed $500,000, and covers only six 
specified crafts: Iron Workers, Steamfitters, Sheetmetal Workers, 
Electricians, Elevator Construction Workers, and Plumbers and Pipe-
fittersY; The Plan requires a potential contractor either to agree in 
his bid to rely on a multi-employer program supervised by the 
Office of Federal Contract Compliance/6 or to submit an affirma-
tive action program for recruiting minority employees17 which is 
satisfactory under the Plan. Such a program must "include specific 
goals of minority manpower utilization within the ranges to be 
established by the Department of Labor, in cooperation with the 
Federal contracting and administering agencies in the Philadelphia 
Area .... 1118 
The Labor Department, through its Office of Federal Contract 
Compliance, held public hearings, where the following factors were 
considered: 
(1) The current extent of minority group participation in the 
trade. 
(2) The availability of minority group persons for employment in 
such trade. 
(3) The need for training programs in the area and/or the need to 
assure demand for those in or from the existing training programs. 
(4) The impact of the program upon the existing labor force.19 
Based on these four factors, the Labor Department set employment 
goals for minority workers in the six affected trades. These begin 
at four to six percent for the employer's 1970 work force, and 
increase to a high of 20 percent in each trade after four years.20 The 
include specific goals or ranges set by either the State or Federal Governments prior 
to the bidding. 
14 Bucks, Chester, Delaware, Montgomery, and Philadelphia counties. June 27 
Order, supra note 3, at I. 
111 September 23 Order, supra note I, at 4-5. See note 9 supra. 
16 September 23 Order, supra note I, app. at 4. 
17 These workers include "Negro, Oriental, American Indian, Spanish Surnamed 
American. Spanish Surnamed American includes all persons of Mexican, Puerto Rican, 
Cuban or Spanish origin or ancestry." September 23 Order, supra note I, app. at 5. 
18 Id. This requirement of specific goals, developed in response to the Comp-
troller General's I968 ruling, note I2 supra, has been the focus of the controversy 
surrounding the revised Plan. See notes 25-35 infra, and accompanying text. 
19 September 23 Order, supra note I, at I2-I3. 
2o Id. at I5. 
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contractor's duty under the Plan is to make a good faith attempt to 
meet his goal of minority employment by broadening his recruitment 
base, but the Plan expressly prohibits him from discriminating 
against any individual applicant or employee while doing so. 21 If the 
contractor does not agree to make this good faith attempt, the 
O.F.C.C. cannot accept his bid, even though it be the lowest sub-
mitted. It must turn instead to the lowest bidder who agrees to 
broaden his recruitment base and meet the goals set forth. 
In addition, the O.F.C.C. has the duty, once the contract has 
actually commenced, to conduct periodic checks on the contractor 
to determine if his program is being adhered to. The affirmative 
action program is the equivalent of any other material condition 
of a government contract. If the contractor breaches that condition, 
the O.F.C.C. may cancel the contract and sue for damages resulting 
from that cancellation. 
Failure of a contractor to reach his goals is not, however, a 
per se breach, for he may defend by showing that he has made a 
"good faith effort" to reach them.22 In order to find that a contractor 
has made that legitimate good faith effort, the O.F.C.C. will look 
to his efforts to broaden his recruitment through at least the follow-
ing activities: 
(a) Notifying the community organizations (registered with the 
O.F.C.C. Area Coordinator) of opportunities for minority work-
ers on the government contract. 
(b) Maintaining a file of each minority worker referred to him, 
specifying what action was taken with respect to each referred 
worker. 
(c) Notifying the O.F.C.C. Area Coordinator whenever he has infor-
mation that the union referral process has impeded him in his 
effort to meet his goal. 
(d) Demonstrating that he participated in the Labor Department's 
training programs which are designed to provide trained crafts-
men in the specified trade. 23 
Reliance upon the practices of a local labor union to secure the goals 
clearly is not enough to qualify as a good faith attempt.24 
IV. THE CoNTROVERSY SuRROUNDING THE PHILADELPHIA PLAN 
The major and most complete attack on the Philadelphia Plan 
was nuide by the Comptroller General, who once again found 'It to 
21 Id. app. at 5. 
22 Id. at 17. 
23 Id. at 17-18. 
24 June 27 Order, supra note 3, at 10 .. 
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be invalid. This time, however, the invalidity related to the corrected 
defect of which he had seemingly stimulated development. Because 
of the specific goals in the program, he reasons, the contractor will 
be irresistibly drawn to look to the race or national origin of indi-
vidual applicants, and such race or national origin will prove to be 
the decisive factor in deciding whether or not to hire an individuaP5 
Such racial considerations, he argues, are directly outlawed by two 
separate sections of the 1964 Civil Rights Act: Section 703(a) 
dealing with individual discrimination because of race, and Section 
703 (j) dealing with preferential treatment of individuals or groups 
of individuals.26 
If, for example, a contractor requires 20 plumbers and is committed to 
a goal of employment of at least five from minority groups, every 
nonminority applicant for employment in excess of 15 would, solely 
by reason of his race or national origin, be prejudiced in his op-
portunity for employment, because the contractor is committed to make 
every effort to employ five applicants from minority groups ... the 
essential question is whether the Plan would require the contractor 
to select a black craftsman over an equally qualified white one. We see 
no room for doubt that the contractor in [this] situation ... would 
believe he would be expected to employ the black applicant[s], at 
least until he had reached his goal of five nonminority [sic] group 
employees .... 27 
In an opinion issued after the Comptroller General's,28 Attorney 
General Mitchell declared the Plan to be lawful. Though he agrees 
25 Comptroller General's Opinion, supra note 11, at 7. An important counter-
vailing consideration is the weight the craft unions would exert against such minority 
"favoritism." See notes 36-44 infra, and accompanying text. 
26 Comptroller General's Opinion, supra note 11, at 6. Section 703{a) makes it an 
unlawful employment practice for an employer: 
to fail or refuse to hire, or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to 
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin; 
Section 703 (j) provides that: 
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require any 
employer, employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management 
committee subject to this subchapter to grant preferential treatment to any 
individual or to any group because of the race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin of such individual or group on account of an imbalance which 
may exist with respect to the total number or percentage of persons of any 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin employed by any employer, 
referred or classified for employment by any employment agency or labor 
organization, admitted to membership or classified by any labor organization, 
or admitted to, or employed in, any apprenticeship or other training pro-
gram, in comparison with the total number or percentage of persons of such 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in any community, State, section, 
or other area, or in the available work force in any community, State, section, 
or other area. 
42 U.S.C. § 2000{e) (1964). See notes 50-57 infra, and accompanying text. 
27 Comptroller General's Opinion, supra note 11, at 13. 
28 Attorney General's Opinion of September 22, 1969 [hereinafter cited as 
Attorney General's Opinion]. 
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with the Comptroller General that Section 703 (a) of the Civil Rights 
Act requires each individual to be treated without regard to race, he 
argues that the Plan itself explicitly forbids just the kind of racial 
considerations at the hiring stage to which the Comptroller General 
makes reference.29 It concerns itself only with broadening the 
recruitment base of government contractors and does not refer in 
any way to dealing with individual applicants, except to outlaw racial 
considerations at the non-recruitment or hiring stage.30 In com-
menting upon the Comptroller General's example of the twenty 
plumbers, the Attorney General reaches a very different conclusion. 
If the contractor has filled fifteen of these posts with nonminority 
plumbers, says the Comptroller General, the next white applicant for 
one of the five vacancies will inevitably be discriminated against by 
reason of the fact that he is not a member of a minority group. Doubt-
less a part of the good faith effort ... would have been to avail himself 
of manpower sources which might be expected to produce a repre-
sentative number of minority applicants, so that the situation posed in 
the Comptroller General's example would arise but infrequently. Yet, 
quite clearly, if notwithstanding the good faith efforts of the employer 
such a situation does arise, the qualified nonminority employee may be 
hired. The fact that the minority employment goal was to this extent 
not reached would not in itself be sufficient ground for concluding that 
the contractor had not exerted good faith efforts to reach it.31 
The Comptroller General, in anticipation of the argument raised 
by the Attorney General, has refuted it as one of "semantics."32 He 
believes that a contractor covered under the Plan will find it im-
possible to avoid looking to the race of individual applicants in 
fulfilling his commitment to hire minority workers. The contractor 
will be encouraged to do so by the belief that, inevitably, bidders 
who have met their goals will be looked upon more favorably on 
29 "[The contractor may] not discriminate against qualified employees or ap-
plicants [because] the purpose of the Philadelphia Plan is to place squarely upon 
the contractor the burden of broadening his recruitment base whether within or 
without the existing union referral system . . . [and it is not] intended and shall not 
be used to discriminate against any qualified applicant or employee." Id. at 5, 13, 14. 
30 "Nothing in the Philadelphia Plan requires an employer to violate section 
703 (a). The employer's obligation is to make every good faith effort to meet his goals. 
A good faith effort does not include any action which would violate section 703(a) 
or any other provision of Title VII ... [t]o remove any doubt the Plan specifies 
that the contractor's commitment shall not be used to discriminate against any 
qualified applicant or employee." I d. at 10. 
31 Id. at 13. 
32 "Whether the provision of the Plan requiring a bidder to commit himself to 
hire-or make every good faith effort to hire-at least the minimum number of 
minority group employees specified in the ranges established for the designated 
trades is, in fact, a 'quota' system . . . or is a 'goal' system, is in our view largely 
a matter of semantics, and tends to divert attention from the end result of the Plan-
that contractors commit themselves to making race or national origin a factor for 
consideration in obtaining their employees." Comptroller General's Opinion, supra note 
11, at 7. 
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huge multi-million dollar projects than those who have not. Because 
the Plan will result in encouraging an employer to make race or 
national origin a determinative factor in his decision to hire workers, 
the Comptroller General argues, it crosses over into the restricted 
bounds of quotas and individual discrimination as prohibited by 
Sections 703(a) and 703(j). 
In recent legislative action, Congress has implicitly adopted 
the position of the Attorney General, and rejected that of the Comp-
troller General. In the closing weeks of 1969, an amendment which 
would have accepted the Comptroller General's interpretation of the 
Philadelphia Plan and upheld his decision not to pay for contracts 
issued under it was introduced in the Senate.33 The debate over 
the bill was long and vigorous, with the two sides basically 
adopting the position of either the Attorney General or the Comp-
troller GeneraP4 The Attorney General's position prevailed, and 
the amendment was defeated.35 In recognition of the Congress' 
apparent desire to go forward with the Plan, the Comptroller General 
has since dropped his previously announced plans to refuse to pay 
out any money to contractors complying with its terms. 
V. THE NEED FOR RACIAL QUOTAS 
Regardless of whether one supports the position of the Comp-
troller General that the Philadelphia Plan establishes quotas, or 
agrees with the Attorney General that it does not, a more important 
question must be faced: will the Philadelphia Plan work? Will it 
end discrimination against nonwhites on government contracts? The 
sa Amendment 33 to the Senate version of H.R. 15209 reads as follows: 
In view of and in confirmation of the authority invested in the Comptroller 
General of the United States by the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, 
as amended, no part of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available by 
this or any other Act, shall be made available to finance, either directly or 
through any Federal aid or grant, any contract or agreement which the 
Comptroller General of the United States holds to be in contravention of 
any Federal statute .... 
115 CoNG. REc. § 17624 (daily ed. Dec. 22, 1969). Debate over the amendment 
indicated that it was put in solely to endorse the position of the Comptroller General 
vis-a-vis the Philadelphia Plan. 
"Senator Byrd (Dem. W. Va.): Of course, the factual situation which brought 
this issue to a head involved the so-called Philadelphia Plan." I d. at § 17634. 
"Senator Percy (Rep. Ill.): There is only one smart way to resolve this [em-
ployment situation] and that is by establishing procedures which stimulate, prod, 
and encourage both sides to agree together on sound, equitable hiring practices. This 
is the Philadelphia Plan. This is not coercive, as some have sought to make it ... . "/d. 
at § 17630. 
34 /d. at § 17625-34. 
35 Though it had once passed, the amendment was rejected by the House, then 
deleted by the Senate. Final vote on the measure was 39 in favor (of deleting the 
amendment) 1 29 opposed. /d. at .§ 17634. 
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realities of the construction industry lead one to conclude that the 
Plan will not work. A plan which does not lay out specific, strict 
racial quotas will not work because racial attitudes have hardened 
almost to the breaking point. In addition, rising problems of infla-
tion and automation are combining to raise the level of unemploy-
ment and promise to result in less and less opportunity for the lower 
or nonskilled tradesmen, of which nonwhites make up a dispropor-
tionate share.36 
Moreover, the powerful craft unions wholly control the hiring 
in the construction industry.37 To predict that the manpower goals 
will indeed be utilized as quotas, and that employers will look to the 
race of individuals so as to give preference to nonwhites is to dis-
count the sheer force and power of the construction unions. 38 These 
powerful unions are likely to bring substantial pressure to bear if the 
contractor attempts to hire nonwhite, nonunion workers for high 
paying construction jobs to the exclusion of white, union applicants. 
This is an industry which has historically ignored all moves toward 
nondiscrimination.39 Many varied attempts have been made na-
tionally and locally to end job discrimination. Such attempts in-
cluded actions under the National Labor Relations Act40 and the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, the creation of State Fair Employment 
Practices Commissions,41 and various self-help mechanisms.42 All 
these attempts have failed. Still the nonwhite works for much less 
36 See generally L.A. Times, Feb. 7, I970, § I, at 1, col. 1, where Labor Editor 
Harry Bernstein discussed the most recent unemployment survey [as yet unpub-
lished] issued in January by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
37 " [Contractors] . . . rely on the construction craft unions as their prime or 
sole source of their labor . . . [and] referral by a union is a virtual necessity for 
obtaining employment in union construction projects, which constitute the bulk of 
commercial construction." Comptroller General's Opinion, supra note 11, at 3. In 
Philadelphia, the Labor Department also found that nonunion membership was 
tantamount to nonemployment on the government contracts. Such union activity in 
referring only union members for jobs is clearly a violation of the National Labor 
Relations Act, § 8(a}(3}, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a}(3} (1964), yet it is a violation not 
easily proven. See generally Teamsters Local 357 v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667, 673-74 
(I96I). 
38 The power of the unions is especially great in the construction industry. See 
Department of Labor News Release, September 23, 1969 (Secretary Shultz). 
39 See note 9 supra, and accompanying text. 
40 See United Packinghouse Workers v. NLRB, 4I6 F.2d 1126 (D.C. Cir. 
1969), for a novel (and potentially revolutionary) approach to employee com-
plaint coverage under the NLRA: holding racial discrimination to be a per se viola-
tion of § 8(a} (I} (29 U.S.C. § I58(a} (1) (I964}) of the Act. Unfortunately, such 
an approach is highly unlikely to become widespread. 
41 See Hill, Twenty Years of State Fair Employment .Practice Commissions: A 
Critical Analysis with Recommendations, I4 BuFFALO L. REv. 22 (1965). 
42 Such as the ever increasing economic boycotts and applications of political 
and social pressures. Note, for example, the recent strikes in Pittsburgh and Chicago 
which closed down numerous construction sites. NEWSWEEK, Oct. 6, 1969, at lOS, and 
Sept. 8, I969,. a~ 34, 
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money each year than his white counterpart, is out of work for much 
longer periods of time and much more often,43 and is, on the whole, 
excluded from membership in many vital unions.44 
The situation is strikingly parallel to that in public education. 
For fifteen years, the courts relied on the school boards to desegre-
gate with "all deliberate speed."45 These courts have found, however, 
after fifteen difficult and frustrating years, that only by ordering 
immediate desegregation, with the school boards drafting and adher-
ing to strict desegregation plans (and only under close and careful 
judicial scrutiny) will the legality of desegregation become reality. 
Allowing school boards to initiate "good faith" freedom of choice 
plans simply achieves nothing for those who are being discriminated 
against.46 It is unrealistic for the Government to request desegrega-
tion or forbid segregation-such a well intended, sweeping action 
simply does not work. 
There is no reason to believe that persuasion, conciliation, and 
requirements of good faith efforts will achieve any more in employ-
ment than they have in education/7 nor to believe that a law which 
places the burden of going forth on the nonwhite worker/8 who is 
being discriminated against, will work. The overlapping anti-dis-
crimination statutes and orders have not accomplished any real 
change because they proclaim a policy of color-blindness in a color 
conscious society. The only approach, therefore, which will work 
in employment is the one ordered in education: strict numerical 
requirements and a time schedule for hiring nonwhite workers, i.e., 
racial quotas.49 
43 See generally EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITYS CoMMISSION, REPORT No. 
1 (1966). 
44 See note 5 supra, and accompanying text. 
41! Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955). 
46 "In my opinion there is no reason why such a wholesale deprivation of con-
stitutional rights [segregated schools] should be tolerated another minute. I fear that 
this denial of constitutional rights is due in large part to the phrase 'with all 
deliberate speed.' I would do away with that phrase completely.'' Alexander v. 
Holmes City Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 1218, 1222 (1969) (Black, J.) (application to 
vacate suspension of order denied). 
"The time for mere 'deliberate speed' has run out. . . . The burden on a school 
today is to come forward with a plan that promises realistically to work, and 
promises realistically to work now." Green v. New Kent School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 
439 (1968). 
47 See generally United States v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 
888-91 (5th Cir. 1967). 
48 The present procedure under the 1964 Civil Rights Act for suits brought 
under it. 
49 There may, however, be some basis for the view that local solutions, singularly 
unsuccessful in the past, should be exhausted before having the Federal Government 
step. in and. impose a tough program on a community. A fresh new local approach 
is being attempted in Chicago, where a plan quite similar to the Philadelphia Plan 
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VI. THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS AcT, THE CONSTITUTION AND 
STRICT RACIAL QUOTAS 
If such a revolutionary program as a strict racial quota system 
is to be initiated on Federal contracts, two different standards must 
be met, restrictions in the 1964 Civil Rights Act, and limitations 
set forth in the Constitution. The 1964 Civil Rights Act does appear 
to prohibit such quotas. It is the thesis of this comment, however, 
that the Constitution does more than permit racial quotas by the 
Government. It requires them. Therefore, if the Act prohibits what 
we shall see is a constitutional requirement, that prohibition would 
itself fall as an unconstitutional restriction. 
A. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 
It is argued that an employment quota system based on race 
would violate the Civil Rights Act in two separate ways: it is prefer-
ential treatment, outlawed by Section 703 (j), and it would result in 
discrimination against whites as forbidden by Section 703 (a). 
Section 703 (j) provides that 
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require 
any employer ... to grant preferential treatment to any individual or 
to any group because of the race [or] color ... of such individual or 
group .... 5o 
The Comptroller General asserts that Section 703 (j) must be read 
as forbidding racial quotas, for that, he declares, was the clear 
legislative intent behind the section.51 The legislative history he 
cites/2 however, does not support this conclusion. Rather the Sen-
ators were saying that the title itself gives no power to anyone to 
require quotas. They were not saying that the title forbids anyone 
from so requiring, or that the power to require such quotas cannot 
derive from another source, such as a court or executive order 
was developed by the City of Chicago, the black community, and local employers 
and unions, and not by the Federal Government. See L.A. Times, Jan. 18, 1970, § F, 
at 1, col. 1. The major difficulty with such a plan, as Senator Percy (himself an 
advocate of local plans) noted, is that there simply are no tough enforcement mea-
sures to make sure that all parties abide by the plan. 115 CoNG. REC. § 17630 
(daily ed. Dec. 22, 1970). 
50 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(e)-2(j) (1964); see note 26 supra. 
51 Comptroller General's Opinion, supra note 11, at 8. 
52 Senator Humphrey: "Contrary to the allegations of some opponents of this 
title, there is nothing in it that will give any power to the Commission or to any court 
to require hiring, firing, or promotion of employees in order to meet a racial 'quota' 
or to achieve a certain racial balance." 110 CoNG. REC. 6549 (I 964). 
Senators Clark and Case: 
"There is no requirement in title VII that an employer maintain a racial balance 
in his work force." Id. at 7213. 
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based on the Constitution. 53 Section 703 (j) simply states that Con-
gress did not see fit to require preferential treatment in Title VII; 
it does not declare such preferential treatment to be forbidden or 
unlawful. 
There are two very distinct issues involved which the Comp-
troller General seems to merge, what the Act requires, limited by 
Section 703 (j), and what the Act prohibits, in Section 703 (a). Sec-
tion 703 (a) makes it an unlawful employment practice for an 
employer 
to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to 
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, 
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such 
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin .... 54 
Requiring an employer to follow a quota seems to encourage him 
to fail or refuse to hire any individual (the white man not covered 
by the quota) because of such individual's race. There can be 
very little doubt that in order to meet his quota an employer 
may well have to hire a black or brown man rather than a white 
man even though their job "credentials" are not as impressive. 
Section 703 (a) appears then to make such conduct unlawful. 55 
Another construction of Section 703 (a) is available, however. 
It seems not unreasonable to read "fail or refuse to hire ... or other-
wise to discriminate against ... " as making it unlawful to fail or 
refuse to hire an individual only if the employer's purpose is to 
discriminate against him by this failure or refusal. In the case of 
the white worker who is turned away from the job, he is not discrim-
inated against. He is refused a job, not because the employer feels 
any ill will toward him, or harbors any racial bigotry, but only 
because the employer (or the Federal Government) wishes to hire 
more nonwhite workers so as to equalize the available opportunities 
in employment. This construction is more credible when one looks 
to the rationale behind the entire 1964 Civil Rights Act, nonwhites 
53 The Comptroller General himself accepted the independent authority of the 
President to issue Exec. Order 11,246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319 (1965), with or without 
the Civil Rights Act as additional authority. Comptroller General's Opinion, supra 
note 11, at 2. 
54 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(e)-2(a) (1964). 
55 This is how Senators Clark and Case apparently felt. " ... (A)ny deliberate 
attempt to maintain a racial balance, whatever such a balance may be, would involve 
a violation of title VII because maintaining such a balance would require an em-
ployer to hire or to refuse to hire on the basis of race. It must be emphasized that 
discrimination is prohibited as to any individual." 110 CoNG. REc. 7213 (1964). 
The Attorney General agrees with this view of § 703 (a). See text accompanying 
note 29 supra. 
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were being treated unequally at all levels of society because of their 
race, and something was needed to end such inequality.116 
Two constructions of Section 703 (a), therefore, are available. 
To use the latter and allow quotas seems to contradict much of the 
sentiment expressed by the lawmakers who enacted Section 703 (a). 
To adopt the former, however, might immediately draw the section 
into conflict with a constitutional requirement for racial quotas on 
Federal contracts.57 
B. Are Quotas Permissible under the Constitution? 
The major constitutional objection to racial quotas on Federal 
contracts is the claim that such quotas would violate the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which has been interpreted 
to require the same racial equality of the Federal Government as 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does of 
the states.58 It is argued that, because the employment quotas cover 
only nonwhites, whites will be treated unequally. However, even 
though the white worker may be treated unequally, it does not follow 
that his constitutional rights have somehow been infringed, as the 
56 See H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 1963; EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OP-
PORTUNITYS COMMISSION, REPORT No. 1 (1966). 
57 See notes 69-79 infra, and accompanying text. A very similar problem arises 
in the interpretation of § 202 (1) of Executive Order 11,246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319 
(1965), for it provides that: 
The contractor will not discriminate against any employee or applicant for 
employment because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. The 
contractor will take affirmative action to ensure that applicants are em-
ployed, and that employees are treated during employment, without re-
gard to their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Such action shall 
include but not be limited to the following: employment upgrading, demo-
tion or transfer; recruitment or recruitment advertising; layoff or termina-
tion; rates of pay or other forms of compensation; and selection for 
training, including apprenticeship. 
E.O. 11,246 appears to go even one step beyond § 703 (a), for it requires that 
employees be treated "without regard to their race," and not just that the employer 
may not discriminate against any individual. Thus, a quota which may force employers 
to look to the race of individuals would appear to be causing them to treat appli-
cants with regard to their race. While E.O. 11,246 must face the same conflict with 
a constitutional requirement for a quota as § 703 (a), a real difference exists between 
them. Although a court could order quotas implemented on Federal contracts, with 
or without a modification of E.O. 11,246, it is unlikely that any large scale racial 
quota would ever be imposed on contractors without the President's authorization, 
and the President has the power to amend, modify, or even revoke prior executive 
orders. 
58 Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497,500 (1954). See also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 
U.S. 618, 642 (1968); Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 168 (1964); Fernandez v. 
Meier, 408 F.2d 974, 976 (9th Cir. 1969); Whirl v. Kern, 407 F.2d 781, 786 (5th 
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 901 (1969). 
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Comptroller General apparently feels.59 The purpose of having an 
equal protection test is to determine if an action by the government 
unconstiutionally deprives any individual of his rights, or, stated 
another way, whether the individual has the "right" which he claims. 
If there is an overriding purpose for the Government's action, and 
there is no less onerous alternative for achieving that purpose, no 
rights are denied, even though the individual is treated unequally.60 
The purpose of the Federal Government in requiring racial 
quotas on its contracts would be to end the racial discrimination 
which nonwhites have been systematically and historically subjected 
59 " ••• [W]e believe there is a material difference between the situation in those 
cases, where enforcement of the rights of the minority individuals to vote or to have 
unsegregated education or housing facilities does not deprive any member of a 
majority group of his rights, and the situation in the employment field, where the 
hiring of a minority worker, as one of a group whose number is limited by the employ-
er's needs, in preference to one of the majority group precludes the employment of the 
latter." Comptroller General's Opinion, supra note 11, at 14 (emphasis added). 
60 Normally an equal protection issue such as this would be resolved by deter-
mining whether the purpose of the governmental action is a rational, legitimate 
one, and whether the means employed to achieve that end are reasonably connected 
to it. "Although the equal protection clause is, of course, concerned with classifications 
which result in disparity of treatment, not all classifications resulting in disparity are 
unconstitutional. If classification is reasonably related to the purpose of the govern-
mental activity involved and is rationally carried out, the fact that persons are 
thereby treated differently does not necessarily offend." Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. 
Supp. 401, 511 (D.D.C. 1967). See also Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968); Norvell 
v. Dlinois, 373 U.S. 420 (1963); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963); McGowan 
v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Allied Stores v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522 (1959); 
Horowitz, Unseparate but Unequal--The Emerging Fourteenth Amendment Issue in 
Public School Education, 13 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1147 (1966) [hereinafter cited as 
Horowitz]; Tussman and ten Broek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. 
L. REv. 341 (1949). 
In some areas, however, because of the important nature of the interests involved, 
something more than this normal test is required to resolve the equal protection 
claims. These other areas include actions which: deprive a citizen of his voting 
franchise, Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965), where servicemen were prohibited 
from voting in state elections; limit the indigent's ability to defend himself at the 
appellate level of the criminal process, Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), 
wllere the appellate court had the right to determine if sufficient reason existed for 
providing the indigent defendant with counsel for appeal, and Griffin v. Illinois, 
351 U.S. 12 (1956), where trial transcripts were not provided to indigent defendants 
seeking appeal; or classify citizens as to race, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), 
where the state banned interracial marriages, and McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 
184 (1964), where the state forbad racially mixed couples from living together out 
of wedlock. 
In these areas, a much tougher test is utilized to resolve the questions raised. 
Here the courts require more than the "rational basis and means" determination, for 
in all the cases cited above there was, at least arguably, some rational basis for the 
action taken by the state. The action must be validated by an overriding statutory 
purpose and the government must sustain a very heavy burden of justification to 
show that there are no less onerous alternatives for achieving that purpose. See 
generally Horowitz, supra, at 1162-66. See also Loving v. Virginia, supra; Rinaldi 
v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305 (1966); McLaughlin v. Florida, supra; McGowan v. Mary-
land, supra. 
1970] COMMENTS 831 
to.61 Quotas would provide nonwhites with more than the present one 
percent of construction contract jobs they now have in many cities, 
including Philadelphia, and would also begin to solve many of the 
unemployment (and underemployment) problems which nonwhites 
must face when turned away from construction employment. In addi-
tion, such quotas would begin to eliminate some of the less tangible 
but equally severe effects of racial discrimination in employment: 
hate, fear, docility, and "an inhibition to act for change."62 
The critics of racial quotas in employment contend, however, 
that the purpose behind the quotas cannot be overriding or essential 
because of the effects such quotas will have on white workers: they 
will not be able to get particular jobs which but for the quotas they 
would get, and they may find themselves without jobs.63 Yet even 
given this possibility, the purpose of ending racial discrimination 
so outweighs any harm done to white workers as to still be overriding 
and vital. The only alternative to such quotas and potential harm 
to white workers is to retain the same methods of anti-discrimination 
enforcement as have been used in the past, i.e., to perpetuate the 
virtual exclusion of nonwhite workers from the construction industry. 
Moreover, although potential harm to white workers is present in 
the form of unemployment, this is no greater harm than if non-
whites had never been discriminated against, for then all workers 
would presumably have been treated equally-nonwhites would not 
have been as greatly unemployed or underemployed as they are. 
White workers, through a system of manpower supply and demand, 
would have had less employment than they do now.64 For the Gov-
ernment then to begin to require quotas on its contracts is simply 
to strip away the results of past racial inequalities; white workers 
would be affected as if there had been no racial discrimination 
against nonwhites in the past. Hence, even with potential harm to 
white workers, the overriding purpose for the quotas remains. Unless 
employment opportunities can somehow be equalized, one must drop 
61 See notes 1-9 supra, and accompanying text. 
62 United Packinghouse Workers v. NLRB, 416 F.2d 1126, 1136-37 (D.C. Cir. 
1969). See note 72 infra. 
63 See generally L.A. Times, Feb. 7, 1970, § 1, at 1, col. 1. The Labor Department 
argues that no whites will be put out of work as a result of its employment goals, 
because the goals will merely take up the attrition and growth "slacks" in the con-
struction industry. September 23 Order, supra note 1, at 9. There is, however, evidence 
to the contrary, especially in light of the slump the construction industry is presently 
in. See Peter, Housing: From Crisis to Disaster? LooK, Feb. 10, 1970, at 53. 
64 This is, of course, assuming that the infusion of nonwhite workers into the 
construction industry would not have resulted in increased growth in the industry 
(due to the broader spending power which would have resulted for nonwhites) and 
therefore more jobs for all construction workers. While no statistical evidence is 
available on this point, one can safely assume that such infusion of nonwhites would 
have indeed expanded economic growth at least to some extent. 
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any hopes of ever equalizing any other social, economic, or political 
opportunities in our nation.65 · 
Given an overriding statutory purpose for racial quotas, there 
still remains the question of whether any less onerous alternative 
exists to achieve that purpose. Unfortunately, no less onerous alter-
native does exist.60 The Civil Rights Act, Executive Orders, and State 
F.E.P.C.s have had no material success. The nonwhite worker is 
still in the same comparative situation he was in twenty years ago, 
long before any of these anti-discrimination efforts were made.67 
A goals system, such as the Philadelphia Plan, will not work because 
it does not have the power to shatter the bitter racial attitudes 
which pervade the construction industry, nor can it end the strangle-
hold the union appears to have on construction contractors.68 
Therefore, since the only means for achieving an end to racial 
discrimination is strict racial quotas initiated by the Federal Gov-
ernment, such action is not prohibited by the Constitution. 
C. Are Quotas Required by the Constitution? 
Racial quotas are a factual necessity to combat the grossly 
unfair and unequal employment conditions which exist on Federal 
construction contracts. They are also a constitutional necessity. This 
is true because the Federal Government is required to eradicate 
conditions of present and past discrimination in which it has been 
involved through past action, and because it cannot now take part 
in racial discrimination.69 Past policies of contract issuance have 
contributed to, and present "color blind" policies support, racial 
discrimination. Thus, an affirmative duty must be imposed on 
the Government to end and undo the effects of this discrimination 
through the only effective means available, racial quotas.70 
65 See note 72 infra. 
oo Some have argued that there is another alternative to racial quotas, quotas for 
all poor people. The appeal of such a program primarily rests with the fact that 
it would benefit whites as well as nonwhites. The problem, however, is that poor 
whites do not need quotas to get jobs-they are not discriminated against because of 
their race, they are merely unskilled. A training program would work for them, even 
though such programs have proved. to be a failure for nonwhites. 
67 See notes 1-9 supra, and accompanying text. 
68 See notes 37-49 supra, and accompanying text. 
69 The same questions are involved with actions by the Federal Government as 
they are with actions by the states. See text accompanying note 58 supra. 
70 The Comptroller General felt otherwise about the requirement for quotas: 
"Even if the present composition of an employer's work force or the membership of a 
union is the result of past discrimination, there is no requirement imposed by the 
Constitution, by a mandate of the Supreme Court, or by the Civil Rights Act for 
an employer or a union to affirmatively desegregate its personnel or membership." 
Comptroller General's Opinion, supra note 11, at 13. 
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The Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education71 ordered 
public schools to desegregate because of the disastrous effects segre-
gation and discrimination were having on the black youths, and also 
because the states themselves were clearly and actively involved in 
the segregation and discrimination. With employment racial dis-
crimination on Federal contracts, the situation is the same.72 The 
government involvement here is just as decisive as the State Action 
was in Brown. Here, though, the government is involved through its 
money, which supported those who discriminated against nonwhite 
workers. Such financial aid is enough to constitute prohibited State 
Action by the Federal Government.73 
These Federal dollars-part of which are Black, Puerto Rican, Mex-
ican-American, and others-enter local economy primarily through 
Federal contracts. Once these dollars pass the "Gateway" of contract-
ing procedure-the Federal Government has no further control over 
them. Through the "multiplier" effect experienced by imported money 
in the regional economy and the existence of institutionalized segrega-
tion-the Federal Government can be pictured as contributing to the 
denial of the right to succeed for substantial groups of pe<Jple. No 
amount of money spent by whatever level of Government to correct 
this situation can be justified after the fact.74 
Such active financial support is not, however, the only form of the 
71 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
72 "The conclusion that racial discrimination may impede its victims in 
asserting their rights seems inescapable. This docility stems from a number of factors 
-fear, ignorance of rights, and a feeling of low self-esteem engendered by repeated 
second class treatment because of race or national origin. Discrimination in employ-
ment is no different in this respect than discrimination in other spheres. In its 
historic decision in Brown v. Board of Education ... the Supreme Court stated: ' ... 
To separate [Negroes] from other[s] of similar age and qualifications solely because 
of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that 
may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone .... ' ... Dr. 
Kenneth Clark ... has shown discrimination induced self-hatred in Negro inhabitants 
of slums, due in good part to discrimination in employment, creates a feeling of 
inferiority and lack of motivation to assert themselves to change their condition. In 
all this, discrimination in employment thus establishes, or reinforces the effect of 
discrimination in other areas-an inhibition to act for change." United Packinghouse 
Workers v. NLRB, 416 F.2d II26, 1136 (D.C. Cir. 1969). -
These intangible effects of job discrimination such as fear, feelings of inferiority, 
and docility, strongly resemble those engendered by discrimination in the area of 
education. Yet the tangible effects of employment discrimination point to even 
harsher consequences for the nonwhite. He will earn considerably less money than 
the white, and he must live in a slum or ghetto environment where his children are 
forced to attend grossly inferior schools and face emotionally damaging conditions of 
crime and violence daily. In this way the employment discrimination affects not only 
the worker himself, but another entire generation as well. 
73 For other formulations of the government involvement-State Action stan-
dards, see Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966); Burton v. Wilmington Parking 
Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors, 353 U.S. 230 
(1957). 
74 Remarks by Assistant Labor Secretary Fletcher, June 23, 1969 in Philadelphia, 
at 2 [on file with the UCLA Law Review]. 
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Federal Government's involvement with past racial discrimination 
on its projects. Though cognizant of the discrimination which was 
(and is) taking place against nonwhite workers,75 the Federal Gov-
ernment took no effective actions to end the discrimination, such as 
cancellation of contracts. Such inaction has resulted in a continuation 
of the discrimination, for the contractors knew they would not be 
punished for their unlawful deeds. Such silent encouragement or 
stimulation, albeit through omission rather than commission, bears 
the same mark of prohibited State Action as was found in Burton 
v. Wilmington Parkington Authority.76 The essential factor in both 
cases is the official posture of the government, which, by doing 
nothing affirmative, profits (through financial rewards or satisfaction 
of contracts) from the private racial discrimination. 
Even if one were to argue that the Federal Government's past 
involvement with discrimination is somehow not the equivalent of 
the State Action in Burton or Brown,77 the Government would still, 
of course, be precluded from making contracts which would now 
result in racial discrimination against nonwhite workers. Factually, 
this means that the Government may not rely on the present "color 
blind" hiring system. Such a hiring system is theoretically neutral. 
It requires an employer to hire the most qualified and experienced 
worker he can find, regardless of that individual's race-he is simply 
looking for the worker with the most ability. The practice, however, 
perpetuates the effects of past discrimination. In the employment 
area, past instances of racial discrimination have stripped the non-
white of any sort of comparative ability or work skills by denying 
him decent schooling, the chance to belong to a union and receive 
on-the-job apprenticeship training, and by keeping him out of work 
for such long periods as to eliminate any potential skills he might 
have. To rely on the "color blind" ability test is to acknowledge, 
accept, and perpetuate acts of past discrimination against the minor-
ity worker. Thus, to compare abilities or experience will result in 
the nonwhite being turned away on the basis of past racial con-
siderations. Factually such a policy "disregarding" past discrimina-
tion does not make any sense. 
We can't tomorrow say: "All right, we're not going to have any more 
discrimination. We're going to treat all Americans as if they are 
Americans, and therefore everything will be all right." This is non-
711 See September 23 Order, supra note 1, at 5. 
76 365 u.s. 715 (1961). 
77 Much the same argument is made in the school desegregation cases where the 
distinction between de facto and de jure segregation is drawn. See Hobson v. Hansen, 
269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), involving the Washington, D.C. schools; Crawford v. 
Board of Education of Los Angeles, Civil No. 822,854 (L.A. Super. Ct., Feb. 11, 
1970) involving Los Angeles City schools. 
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sense. During the transition from injustice to justice, it is my personal 
opinion that we cannot pretend that there are no consequences of 
past injustices. We've got to face those co.nsequences and do whatever 
is necessary to rectify them .... (These problems) have to be resolved 
by color-consciousness until we get to that ideal state where we need 
no longer worry about a person's color.7B 
Legally, it makes just as little sense. 
Such past conduct may illuminate the purpose and effect of present 
policies and activities and show that policies which appear neutral are 
in fact designed to presently discriminate.79 
835 
This "ability hiring system" in employment is no less discrim-
inatory than is the ability-tracking schemes in education for non-
white youngsters. 
The court does not, however, rest its decision on a finding of 
intended racial discrimination. Apart . from such intentional aspects, 
the effects of the track system must be held to be a violation of plain-
tiffs' constitutional rights. As the evidence in this case makes painfully 
clear, ability grouping as presently practiced ... is a denial of equal 
educational opportunity to the poor and a majority of the Negroes at-
tending school in the nation's capital .... so 
VII. CoNCLUSION 
The unequal employment problems facing the United States are 
truly overwhelming both in scope and in intensity. The Labor De-
partment's Philadelphia Plan is a lawful, yet ineffective, attempt to 
alter that situation on Federal contracts. Only a strict racial quota 
system will alleviate these problems as well as satisfy the constitu-
tional requirement for affirmative government action in this area. 
Section 703 (a) seemingly may be construed so as to forbid such 
quotas. If so, it must fall as an unlawful impingement on a constitu-
78 Doctor Kenneth Clark, quoted in N. HENTOFF, THE NEw EQUALITY at 98 
(1964). 
79 Dobbins v. Local 212, 292 F. Supp. 413, 443 (S.D. Ohio, 1968). See also 
Quarles v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505, 516 (E.D. Va. 1968), where the 
court was forced to look to past practices in the industry as well as by the employer 
to determine if present actions of requiring minority employees to start at the 
bottom of a departmental seniority list when transferring from a "lower" department 
are discriminatory against these workers. The court found that they were, because 
these workers had been forced to remain for long periods of time in the "lower" 
departments due to past racial discrimination. To allow this kind of seniority system 
would simply be to ratify and validate past discrimination, much as if the workers 
were forbidden now to transfer because they possessed no prior skill or experience 
in the new departmental jobs. 
so Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 443 (D.D.C. 1967). Judge Wright went 
on to explain how the background of the black children led to their poor showings 
on ability tests. I d. at 514. · 
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tional duty. However, it can be interpreted as permitting racial 
quotas. 
Having asked ourselves these legal and constitutional question?, 
one further question remains to be answered: should the Federal 
Government adopt as a major policy a racial quota scheme which 
will continue to stress the race problems and differences which exist 
in our country? In a recent article, Professor John Kaplan asserts 
that to initiate racial quotas, whatever the valid purpose, would be 
a mistake, for such quotas can only exacerbate an already frighten-
ingly tense racial situation.81 While not disputing at all that quotas 
may exacerbate our racial situation, one must reject such an argu-
ment as the same argument which has been used throughout the past 
half century to forestall attempts, including the integration of 
schools, to improve the lot of impoverished, oppressed people. It says, 
. "Look, we just cannot do that right now because people will get angry 
and violent; so let's just sit on it awhile." Such an argument, if ever 
valid, can certainly not be accepted today, for other people, those 
who are being discriminated against, are getting angry and violent, 
and for good reason. One must realize that nothing done by the 
Government will, in the short run, prevent violence and anger fr'om 
some segment of society. The real hope is that, even if racial quotas 
do produce such violence and anger now, in the long run they will 
produce equality and justice which will result in domestic tranquillity. 
As the Supreme Court has realized,82 there are some national goals 
which cannot be put off any longer-decent educational opportunities 
is one of these goals, equal employment opportunities must be 
another. 
PAUL MARCUS 
81 Kaplan, Equal Justice in an Unequal World: Equality for the Negro-The 
Problem of Special Treatment, 61 Nw. U.L. REV. 363 (1966). 
82 Holmes v. Alexander Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19 (1969). 
